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Note
“Muéstrame el Dinero”1: Increasing Foreign
Direct Investments in Cuba with a BIT of Help
Kevin Kitchen
The current embargo between the United States and Cuba
shows serious signs of wear and tear. It will not be long before
the United States government decides that the imposed
sanctions have been ineffective, and even detrimental to the
government’s intended purpose. Aside from politics, businesses
continually seek opportunities for expansion, and Cuba finds
itself in a favorable geographic location to position itself as a
gateway between Mexico, Central America, South America, and
the United States. However, American investors and companies
may be reluctant to invest in Cuba because of the potential risks
of doing so.
This Note seeks to show that a bilateral investment treaty
(“BIT”) between Cuba and the United States will help increase
the amount of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) that flows to
Cuba, both from United States investors as well as from other
countries. The first part of this Note will describe aspects of
existing bilateral investment treaties and current economic
conditions in Cuba. It will also discuss the correlation between
BITs and FDI. Section two, the analysis, begins based on the
presumption that BITs increase FDI flows. The first part of the
analysis section will describe current investor perceptions of
Cuba and reasons why American investors might be afraid to
provide large amounts of capital to operations in the country.
The second part of the analysis section will then address
research on current Cuban conditions and will show how a BIT
1. Spanish for “show me the money.” The phrase was popularized by the
movie JERRY MAGUIRE (Gracie Films 1996).
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would help allay the fears of American investors as they plan a
possible endeavor in Cuba. An international treaty for the
protection of investments in Cuba would lower the cost of capital
and signal to the world that the country plans to uphold
significant protections in order to receive desperately needed
FDI.
I. BACKGROUND
A. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
BITs are international treaties, usually between a
developed and developing country, that exchange promises to
treat foreign investments fairly in the host country.2 The general
characteristics of BITs and the protections they provide
demonstrate how they can help improve investor relations in
Cuba.
1. History of BITs
Multiple factors led to the introduction and widespread use
of BITs. Because international law did not take into account
contemporary investment practices, BITs emerged.3 Companies
needed a regime that focused more on their investment needs
and norms of international investment. Likewise, countries
engaged in expropriation of foreign investments without proper
compensation to companies or investors.4 Previous agreements
between countries usually lacked effective enforcement
measures for foreign investors against host countries.5 Part of
this ineffectiveness stemmed from the fact that when an investor
brought an action, the possible remedies only included
negotiating with the host country; suing the host country in its
own courts, if the investors could get past sovereign immunity;
asking the home government to negotiate diplomatically on the
2. Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 405 (2008).
3. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?:
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46
HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 68 (2005).
4. See David Ma, Comment, A BIT Unfair?: An Illustration of the Backlash
Against International Arbitration in Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 571,
572 (2012).
5. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 69.
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company’s behalf; or lobbying the home government to bring a
claim before the International Court of Justice.6 Investors could
not bring a case against the host country before a neutral and
detached arbitration panel.
There has been a lot of progress since the 1970s. BITs now
increase the protection for foreign investors because they
provide a comprehensive and specific set of international rules,
like the ability to bring issues to international tribunals for
enforcement.7 Before BITs, the foreign investor needed to
convince its home country to bring the claim, with no guarantee
that the investor would receive any of the benefits from the
litigation.8 BITs helped change this by allowing the investor to
sue the host country directly. Now there are over 2,000 BITs
worldwide.9 In 1982, the United States began its BIT program.10
Since then, the United States has only signed six BITs with
Central or South American countries.11
2. General Characteristics of BITs
“International investment is the flow of capital, technology
and personnel abroad into ventures or joint ventures that
mutually benefit the foreign investor and the host country.”12 In
order to protect international investments in developing
countries, developed countries sign BITs with the foreign
governments.13 Generally, the agreements indicate that foreign
6. See Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty
Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J.
337, 343 (2007).
7. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 70.
8. Eustace Chikere Azubuike, The Place of Treaties in International
Investment, 19 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 155, 155–56 (2013).
9. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment:
Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
10. Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in
Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Toward a Multilateral
Investment Treaty, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 541, 548 (1994).
11. See United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2016); see also
J. Steven Jarreau, Anatomy of a BIT: The United States - Honduras Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (detailing
the BIT between the United States and Honduras, which is the fourth treaty
between the United States and a South or Central American country).
12. Shenkin, supra note 10, at 567.
13. See Yackee, supra note 2, at 405. It is rare for a BIT to be signed
between two developed nations as only eleven of the 1,857 BITs are between
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investors will receive “nondiscriminatory” treatment, “fair and
equitable” treatment, or protection from “unreasonable” or
“arbitrary” treatment.14 The BIT creates a favorable investment
climate in the host state at the time of entering the treaty.15
Overall, it provides national treatment and eliminates most
restrictions on production and capital remittances.16 Foreign
investors fear discriminatory treatment, but these standards
help protect investors from any discrimination.
An investment treaty can include many different
agreements and covenants. “These investment treaties act like
economic bills of rights, which grant foreign investors
substantive protections and procedural rights to facilitate
investment.”17 The protections fall into four substantive areas:
admission of foreign investors, treatment of foreign investments,
redress for expropriation, and settlement of disputes.18 The core
treaty rights include the right to national treatment, mostfavored-nation treatment, non-discriminatory treatment, fair
and equitable treatment, and the right to compensation for
expropriation.19
While BITs technically only govern issues arising under
“investments,” this term is usually defined by a combination of
“(i) an illustrative list of assets specifically protected with (ii) an
open-ended definition of investment, including all categories of
assets, rights and interests. The result is a broad definition of
investment that protects everything of economic value, virtually
without limitation.”20 Having a broad definition allows investors
developed countries. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 6. Investment
relations between developed countries are usually controlled by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Id.
14. See Yackee, supra note 2, at 416.
15. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic
Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 523 (1998).
16. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 10.
17. Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under
Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C.
DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 48 (2005).
18. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 9; see also Jarreau, supra
note 11, at 431–32.
19. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 14–16. National
treatment is considered the same treatment as the host country’s own nationals.
Id. at 14. Most-favored nation treatment means providing for no less favorable
treatment than any other country in the host nation. Id. Fair and equitable
treatment encapsulates the minimum standard of protection for aliens in
customary international law. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 12 (internal footnotes omitted).
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to know that almost every issue would be covered by the treaty,
and therefore subject to international arbitration.
There are many benefits to signing a BIT. First, it ensures
United States companies who invest abroad will be treated as
favorably as competitors from other nations.21 Second, the treaty
establishes clear limits on expropriation of investments.22 Third,
it provides United States investors with the ability to transfer
funds into and out of the host country immediately while using
the market rate of exchange.23
BITs also limit the ability of a foreign government to require
investors to “adopt inefficient and trade-distorting practices.”24
Most importantly for this Note, BITs provide United States
“investors the right to submit an investment dispute with the
treaty partner’s government to international arbitration.”25
Arbitration provisions are highly important because they are the
enforcement procedural rights to the substantive rights in the
treaty.
These benefits, however, do not come without criticism.
Much of the criticism arises from the interactions between a
powerful, developed country and a weak, developing country.26
The developed country has superior bargaining power compared
to that of the developing country when it comes to concessions of
regulatory rights.27 Furthermore, some believe the treaties are
drafted to benefit the developed country’s investors when
investing in the developing country.28
Specifically for arbitration, critics focus on the threat of
large judgments against developing countries and general
arbitration expenses.29 Two-thirds of filed treaty claims are
against developing countries.30 Rich companies can force states
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 20.
27. See Azubuike, supra note 8, at 193–94; see also Hamilton &
Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 25–26 (positing that developing countries must
give up too many concessions to individual companies in order to attract their
investments).
28. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 20.
29. Developing countries open themselves up to great risk by waiving
sovereign immunity and opening up possible liability. See Franck, supra note 6,
at 346.
30. Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Protection of Foreign Direct Investments in
Developing and Emerging Markets Through the Instrumentality of Arbitration:

252

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

into expensive arbitration by simply claiming a host country’s
regulation interfered with the company’s investment after the
investment failed.31 And while adverse awards are rare, they can
be quite large, especially in relation to the resources of small,
developing countries.32 This threat of large awards rendered
against developing states essentially ties the hands of host
countries, making it harder to create new policies or
regulations.33 However, the benefits outweigh the criticisms
because both countries receive their respective needs, whether
that is developing countries’ need for foreign capital or developed
countries’ search for new markets.
3. Do BITs Accomplish Their Intended Goals?
The BIT movement has three main goals: investment
protection; promotion of foreign investment; and promotion of
economic liberalization.34 To determine if BITs deliver on these
promises this Note analyzes the investment protection and
promotion of FDI that comes from the treaties. Countries have
different needs, and usually developed nations sign BITs to
protect investments where developing nations sign them in
order to promote investments.35 Research shows that BITs do in
fact protect investments through arbitration and this extra
protection creates incentive for firms to increase foreign direct
investment.36

Fair Game?, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 47, 74 (2013).
31. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 21–22.
32. See Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote
Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA J.
INT’L L. 397, 405 (2011) [hereinafter Yackee, Alternative Evidence].
33. Id. Arbitration interferes with sovereign authority, because “permitting
private parties to bring suits against national sovereigns exerts ‘an undue
influence over the domestic conduct of a sovereign in ways that are detrimental
either to the sovereign or to the people . . . .’” Ma, supra note 4, at 578.
34. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 79.
35. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 655, 661 (1990).
36. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 77; see also Ma, supra note 4,
at 584.
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a. BITs Provide Investment Protection and Arbitration
Provisions
The “[c]entral problématique of foreign investment: an
investment, once made, cannot easily be undone, and the
investor who relies on the host state’s initial promises of
favorable treatment risks being rudely surprised when the host
state later demands to renegotiate the terms of the original
deal.”37 An arbitration clause helps ease this fear by providing
investors with a procedural right to enforce the substantive
rights laid out in the treaty.38 These dispute resolution
provisions grant investors access to binding international
arbitration against the host country.39 BITs raise the stakes for
the developing country, as a violation of the treaty is also a
violation of international law.40 This increases risk for states
that may be tempted to violate an investment treaty. Without
an arbitration provision in the BIT, a foreign investor must rely
on host country law for protection of the investment and
enforcement of rights accorded in the treaty.41 Relying on a host
country’s courts further increases the risk of investing abroad.
One of the most common forums for dispute resolution
under investment treaties is the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).42 “ICSID’s
purpose was to ‘provide proceedings for conciliation and
arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states
and nationals of other contracting States.’”43 For ICSID to hear
the matter, the issue must first meet jurisdictional
requirements. ICSID requires an investment dispute between “a
Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting
State,” and it also requires that both parties agree, in writing, to
settle through ICSID arbitration.44
37. Yackee, supra note 2, at 408. This problem also parallels the underlying
ideas of the obsolescing bargain.
38. See id. at 409; see also Franck, supra note 6, at 339–40.
39. Yackee, supra note 2, at 405.
40. See id. at 406.
41. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 75.
42. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 51. ICSID is a part of the
World Bank Group. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 69.
43. Shu-Acquaye, supra note 30, at 65.
44. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 25(1), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965,
575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966); Sue-Acquaye, supra note
30, at 66; see Jarreau, supra note 11, at 492.
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In a Cuba-United States relationship, the United States
would seek to protect rather than promote American
investments in Cuba. BITs protect investments through rules
the host country must follow regarding the foreign investment
and provide processes for enforcing those rules, usually through
international arbitration.45 A BIT provision that is coupled with
enforcement mechanisms constitutes an external check on
governments’ behavior.46 While a dispute between a foreign
investor and host nation is only covered if it falls under the
definition of investment, BITs provide for a very broad definition
of investment, thereby allowing almost any conflict to fit under
the arbitration provision.47
The right to arbitrate is the most significant right provided
by BITs.48 BITs changed the previous dispute resolution system
by allowing companies to bring a suit against the government
without regard for the home country’s political interests.49 It
allows the investor to bypass sovereign immunity and arbitrate
against the host country.50 Further, investor-state arbitration
differs from traditional international commercial arbitration
because the basis of the dispute comes from treaties between
states rather than private agreements.51 International
arbitration has risen to become the preferred mechanism for
resolving international investment conflicts.52 Arbitration
enhances protection because it is separate from political
interests and shields against any possible discrimination within
the host country’s courts. The number of investor-state disputes
has risen sharply to a point where more than half of all the cases
ICSID has heard have started within the last five years.53 The
45. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 79.
46. Id. at 89.
47. See id. at 80. A broad definition of investment allows for more issues to
be brought under the treaty and therefore resolved through international
arbitration; see also Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 12. However,
sometimes the definition of investment relies on the host country’s definition,
i.e. it must fall under that country’s definition in domestic property law.
Stephen R. Halpin III, Note, Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Republic of
Argentina and the Vitality of Host-Country Litigation Requirements in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1979, 1989 (2014).
48. See Ma, supra note 4, at 575.
49. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 88; see also Ma, supra note 4,
at 575.
50. Halpin, supra note 47, at 1981.
51. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 44.
52. Halpin, supra note 47, at 1980.
53. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 43, 55.
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growth of BIT arbitration demonstrates the increasing
reliability of ICSID and the stability of the arbitration
mechanism.
BITs help separate foreign investments from possibly
corrupt governments, because the applicable law typically
includes the BIT, the domestic law of the host country, and
general principles of international law.54 In terms of procedure
and enforcement, the arbitration state’s laws govern.55
Sometimes the investor is allowed to choose the governing law,
but usually the parties decide this issue before signing a treaty.56
The investor normally chooses the forum for arbitration,57 which
typically results in the selection of international arbitration from
either an organization like ICSID or a third-party nation.58
Despite the benefits of the arbitration system, it is still
subject to some criticism. The first major point of contention is
the inconsistency in decisions. Critics believe this inconsistency
has impacted the stabilizing effect of BITs, making investors less
confident in arbitration systems.59 As Franck explains:
For example, in the SGS cases, SGS provided customs
services to governments, such as Pakistan and the
Philippines, under service contracts. There were
problems under those contracts. SGS brought a claim
against Pakistan under the Swiss/Pakistan treaty
alleging a violation of the so-called “umbrella clause;”
likewise, SGS brought a claim against the Philippines for
a violation of a textually similar “umbrella clause” in the
Swiss/Philippines BIT. The issue for both tribunals was
whether the “umbrella clause” transforms a breach of

54. See generally id. at 49 (explaining that arbitral tribunals will
significantly rely on public international law in adjudicating the dispute
because the “typical treaty rights” at issue have been “the subject of
considerable doctrine and jurisprudence in public international law”).
55. See Halpin, supra note 47, at 1983–84, 1992. In BG Group, PLC v.
Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if parties chose the
United States as the seat of arbitration to enforce an award under a BIT, then
the courts of the United States should assume that the treaty members expected
United States law regarding enforcement of awards to control. Id. at 1983–84.
56. Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 52.
57. See id. at 51.
58. See Franck, supra note 17, at 54.
59. See Ma, supra note 4, at 576–77.

256

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1
contract into a breach of treaty. Essentially, one tribunal
said “yes” and the other said “no.”60

Arbitration awards do not technically have official precedential
value; however, arbitrators often consider previous decisions
when faced with a similar issue.61 This can affect the later
analysis of whether BITs increase FDI because “[l]egal
inconsistencies in the area of investment arbitration affect
foreign investment decisions, economic development, and
foreign relations.”62 Even though decisions have the possibility
of inconsistency, the international fora are still the preferred
method of dispute resolution.
The second criticism of arbitration under BITs is whether
the protection is actually needed. Most BITs are signed with
countries that already have a favorable investment climate that
includes protection and regulation of foreign investments.63
Similarly, some countries that signed BITs without arbitration
rights or protections still have large amounts of FDI.64
Essentially, these critics argue that the BIT is not the cause, but
rather just correlates with investment-friendly environments.
However, research shows that investment flows are higher for
countries with a BIT and a strong institutional capacity as
compared to countries with a BIT alone; therefore, a BIT
complements rather than substitutes strong domestic
institutions.65
The third criticism is that BITs are not impactful because
companies may be investing abroad regardless of the risks in
order to gain a place in the market, if the conditions are stable
enough, or the substantive and procedural rights are sufficient

60. See Franck, supra note 17, at 59, n.48.
61. Id. at 56–57.
62. Id. at 57. Inconsistency would lower FDI because it detracts from the
stabilization effect BITs are intended to have. Franck also notes that
inconsistency may signal error or create perception of unfairness. See id. at 57–
58. However, in her research she found that arbitration is fair overall after
comparing how the level of development for each country affects the arbitration
outcome. Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 473 (2009).
63. See Azubuike, supra note 8, at 191. If a host country only provides the
protection required by the BIT then it is probably not a country with a climate
fostering investments, so the exporting country should likely not sign a BIT
with the host country. Vandevelde, supra note 15, at 523.
64. Franck, supra note 6, at 357.
65. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 104.
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without the treaty.66 However, Cuba does not fall into any of
these listed categories, and therefore a BIT is needed as an extra
incentive or protection for investors.
b. BITs Help Developing Countries Increase FDI
Competition among developing countries to attract foreign
capital encourages BITs.67 BITs are tools for promoting and
legally protecting foreign investments.68 Some studies have
suggested that, in general, states benefit from entering into BITs
in that they enjoy larger amounts of foreign investment states.69
FDI in turn influences the world economy by promoting the
transfer of capital, technology, and managerial skills.70 The
correlation between BITs and FDI is noticeable because, while
the number of investment treaties increased from 1973 to 2000,
global FDI also increased from $25 billion to $1.1 trillion in that
timeframe.71 Industrialized countries are more likely to be the
source of foreign capital while developing countries receive
investment flows.72
The major assumption underlying the relationship between
BITs and FDI is: a “[b]ilateral treaty with clear and enforceable
rules to protect and facilitate foreign investment reduces risks
that the investor would otherwise face and that such reductions
in risks, all things being equal, encourage investment.”73 BITs
reduce risk both by stabilizing a host country’s existing
investment environment and fortifying weak domestic laws and
institutions.74 Signing a treaty says a lot about a country’s

66. See Franck, supra note 6, at 357–64 (explaining the “Place Holding
Model” and the “Political and Economic Reality Model” for why investors may
be willing to launch endeavors in developing countries).
67. See Yackee, supra note 2, at 406; see also Andrew T. Guzman, Why Do
LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 67071 (1998).
68. See Hamilton & Rochwerger, supra note 9, at 1.
69. Yackee, supra note 2, at 407; see also Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess,
Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to
Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1582 (2005).
70. Jarreau, supra note 11, at 429.
71. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 71; see also Franck, supra note
6, at 338 (explaining how FDI increased from $200 billion in 1990 to over $1
trillion in 2000).
72. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 95.
73. Id. at 77; see also Ma, supra note 4, at 584.
74. Shu-Acquaye, supra note 30, at 74.
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commitment to protecting foreign investment.75 Signing a BIT
raises the standards of the relationship between the country and
investor to be consistent with international law, making it
harder for the host country to detrimentally change
regulations.76 These assumptions impact FDI flows in three key
ways: first, overall FDI increases in the developing country by
signing a treaty with any country; second, a United States BIT
increases the amount of United States investments flowing into
the developing country; and third, a United States BIT increases
the amount of overall FDI flowing to the developing country from
other countries.
According to research, the idea that signing a BIT with any
country generally increases overall FDI inflow is the least
certain. While a United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) study showed a correlation between
BITs as determinants of FDI flows,77 another study performed
by the U.N. in 1988 found there was no apparent relationship
between the number of bilateral agreements and volume of
FDI.78 One possible explanation could be that the UNCTAD
study occurred after the U.N. study, and especially at a time
when BITs were gaining momentum.79 BITs did not have much
popularity until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another possible
explanation in the discrepancy between studies is the
availability or emphasis on international arbitration provisions.
In a study by Tobin and Ackerman, the results showed that a
BIT could create a negative effect for risky countries initially,
but once they achieved a minimally low level of political risk,
BITs became important tools for attracting FDI.80
75. Signing is a way to “credibly commit” to the promise of treating
investors fairly. Yackee, supra note 2, at 408. “However the existence of an
investment treaty is an important variable that may affect decision to invest
internationally.” Shu-Acquaye, supra note 30, at 55.
76. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 96.
77. See id. at 101. In fact, the UNCTAD study found in one regression that
for each BIT signed in 1993 there was an associated $162 million USD increase
in FDI flows in 1995. Id. at 102.
78. Id. at 100; see also Yackee, Alternative Evidence, supra note 32, at 409–
10 (discussing the Aisbett study, which found that when corrected for
endogeneity, autocorrelation, and omitted variables, the correlation between
BIT and FDI inflows disappeared).
79. Contra Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 102 (explaining some of
the signal power of signing a BIT may have weakened in the 1990s because
investors began to see BITs as a normal feature of the investment structure).
80. Franck, supra note 6, at 351; see also Yackee, Alternative Evidence,
supra note 32, at 410 (describing Kerner’s study showing that BITs induced a
$600 million increase in FDI).
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While the broad statement that BITs increase overall FDI
has researchers on both sides of the fence, the research shows a
stronger relationship between a United States BIT and the
promotion of United States investments.81 “[A] U.S. BIT is
correlated with a major increase in (at a 1% significance level)
U.S. FDI outflows to a given country, ceteris paribus, compared
to U.S. flows to a country without a U.S. BIT . . . .”82 A separate
study conducted by Egger and Pfaffermayr found that a BIT is
associated with a 30 percent increase in outflows from the
exporting country.83 Therefore, signing a United States BIT has
a high likelihood of increasing the amount of foreign investment
the host country would receive from American investors.
A United States BIT is more likely than not to have a
positive role in promoting overall investment, or increasing FDI
inflows from other countries.84 One study found that a United
States BIT correlates with an additional billion dollars per year
in FDI not only from the United States, but also from all
countries.85 United States BIT coefficients range from .77 to .85,
meaning that a BIT with the United States results in an increase
in FDI for a host country in a given year by 77 percent to 85
percent.86 Finally, a BIT with the United States has shown to
relate to an increase in FDI in the developing state from
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) countries compared to FDI flows from OECD to
countries without a BIT with the United States.87 A United
States BIT creates a compounding effect because, not only does
a developing country receive an increase in FDI from United
States investors, but it also paves the way for more investors
from OECD countries.

81. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 105.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Yackee, Alternative Evidence, supra note 32, at 408.
84. See generally Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 111 (detailing the
multiple ways a United States BIT promotes investment).
85. Id. at 109. Contra Franck, supra note 6, at 351 (detailing the study by
Tobin and Ackerman, which found that signing a BIT with the United States
does not increase FDI inflows).
86. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 105.
87. See id. at 104. A study by Hallward-Driemeier argued that bilateral
FDI flows from OECD countries to developing countries is insignificantly
correlated, or even negatively associated with FDI, yet the study considered
bilateral FDI flows rather than the FDI inflows to developing countries. Yackee,
Alternative Evidence, supra note 32, at 407.
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B. BACKGROUND ON CUBA

Cuba has a unique economic history. This section will
describe that history, as well as the nation’s governmental
structure. It will then detail how Cuba is in need of foreign
investors to help grow its economy.
1. History of Foreign Investment in Cuba and Political
Backdrop
Cuba once had an established and stable economy. During
the Soviet Union era, Cuba exported large amounts of sugar and
low-cost primary goods.88 The country received subsidies from
the Soviet Union totaling around four to six billion dollars a
year.89 However, when the Soviet Union fell, Cuba suffered
severe shortages of necessary supplies while its GDP dropped 40
percent from 1989 to 1993.90 Exports dropped by 79 percent and
imports fell by 75 percent during this same time period.91 Since
that time, compounded by the United States embargo, Cuba has
suffered from instability in its markets.92
Cuba’s constitution (“The Socialist Constitution of 1976”)
established Cuba as a socialist state and created an economic
system with state ownership of the means of production.93
Slowly, the country has opened its economy to foreign
investment. In 1992, Cuba amended its constitution to allow
ownership of property by foreign investors.94 Two years later, it
opened the entire economy to foreign investment except for the
public health, education, and armed forces sectors.95 One of the
largest remaining barriers to furthering FDI inflows in Cuba is
the bureaucratic structure of the government and process for
88. See Lucy V. Katz, Arbitration as a Bridge to Global Markets in
Transitional Economies: The Republic of Cuba, 13 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L &
DISP. RESOL. 109, 124–25 (2005).
89. Id. at 124.
90. See id. at 125.
91. Id. at 124–25.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 127.
94. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin
Roof: The Status of Current Foreign Investors in a Post-Transition Cuba, 37
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 885, 887 (2005).
95. Id.; see also Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Alejandro Ferrate,
Recommended Features of a Foreign Investment Code for Cuba’s Free Market
Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 511, 519 (1996).
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approving foreign investment.96 For years this idea of socialism
has stood in opposition to the capitalist ideals of United States
investors.
The most notable difference between Cuba and other
transitioning economies is evidenced by its current embargo.
Before the embargo, trade between the United States and Cuba
exceeded one billion dollars, amounting to 70 percent of Cuba’s
foreign investment inflows.97 However, after a series of
expropriations amounting to 2.25 million acres and two billion
dollars in property, the United States responded with an
embargo against all exports.98 The embargo currently prohibits
direct and indirect transactions, both imports and exports,
between Cuba and the United States, except for certain medical
and agricultural goods.99 Further restrictions added under the
1992 Cuban Democracy Act (“Torricelli Bill”) prohibited foreign
subsidies of United States companies from trading with Cuba,
United States citizens from travelling to Cuba, and family
remittances to the country.100
Most recently, the United States’ Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995 (“Helms-Burton
Act”) solidified the executive orders pertaining to the embargo,
making it so only Congress can modify or lift the embargo.101
Regarding investors, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act places
foreign investors at risk of lawsuit for violating the embargo.102
The United States-Cuba embargo has led to shortages in food,
medicine, and necessary supplies in Cuba.103 Even though the
United States is the only country that has implemented an
embargo with Cuba, the United States actively discourages
other countries from allowing investments in Cuba.104 Now,

96. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P. Trumbull, Foreign
Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 903, 923
(2003).
97. See Christine Zack, Comment, Globalization’s Unlikely Opportunist:
Castro’s Cuba Shapes the Paradigm for Economic and Political Stability in
Latin America, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 358 (2003).
98. Id. at 358–59.
99. Katz, supra note 88, at 123–24.
100. See Zack, supra note 97, at 360.
101. Id. at 363.
102. See id.; see also Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1995, 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2014).
103. See Katz, supra note 88, at 125.
104. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 920.
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many investors are unsure of the current landscape, especially
when attempting to judge the risk of a potential investment.
2. Cuba’s Desperate Need for Foreign Capital
As the increase in interdependence of national economies
continues, a nation must participate in international markets to
reach an acceptable level of economic growth.105 To participate
in these international markets, Cuba and other communist
nations have been forced to liberalize their economies.106 Cuba’s
economy is unique not only because it is transitioning into a freemarket economy, but also because it continues to impose
constraints on foreign investments during this transition.107
Continued liberalization is necessary to have a completely
flourishing economy.
The Cuban government has taken a series of steps to
liberalize its economy. First, Law 50 allowed foreign investors to
form associations, or joint ventures, with state-owned
enterprises.108 Law 50, however, did not end up promoting FDI
because the legislation included a number of restrictions.109
Second, in 1995 the legislature passed Law 77, which was a large
step towards liberalizing Cuba’s investment regime.110 In an
attempt to align its economy with international norms, Cuba
partially opened its economy in the 1990s by allowing some
105. See Katz, supra note 88, at 109.
106. Id. at 109–10. Economic liberalism means the market, rather than the
government, controls economic decisions. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note
3, at 90. BITs help liberalize the economy by facilitating the entry of foreign
investment and establishing conditions favorable for such investments. Id. at
76.
107. See generally Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 527–28
(detailing the multiple ways in which Cuba’s regulatory environment places
constraints on foreign investment). Cuba’s government continues to only allow
investments that further its economic programs and do not compete with stateowned enterprises. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 921. Also, the
government restricts foreign investments to joint ventures with companies that
have a social objective related to the investment, which means the investor
needs to find a Cuban company allowed to conduct the proposed business. Id. at
922.
108. See Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 907. Law Decree 50 of
1982 was the first foreign investment code for Cuba. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate,
supra note 95, at 516.
109. See Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 907.
110. See Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 888; see also Travieso-Diaz
& Ferrate, supra note 95, at 521; Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at
909.
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private ownership of business enterprises.111 Foreign investors
may now participate in joint ventures with state-owned
enterprises, and foreign-owned property cannot be expropriated
without compensation.112 Law 77 allowed funding of joint
ventures, international economic associations, and companies
solely with foreign capital.113 The banking reform in 1997
separated the central bank from the commercial banking
system,
thereby
facilitating
operations
and
foreign
investments.114 Law 77 still protects the socialist regime by
requiring companies to pay the government for the workers’
labor, which in turn pays the workers in pesos.115 Liberalizing
the economy allowed more foreign investors to enter the nation,
further developing the economy.
Most recently, the legislature passed a new foreign
investment act opening investment in all economic sectors.116 It
still restricts foreign investment in the public health, education
sectors, and armed forces. Foreign investment must receive an
authorization from the Council of State or another authority
after submitting the business proposal to the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Foreign Investment (“MINCEX”).117 The law provides
guarantees to those properly authorized, but still allows for
expropriation in some instances.118
In 2001 FDI inflows for Cuba were $1.9 billion.119 While this
is a significant amount, it is relatively low compared to other
Central American and Caribbean countries.120 The next section
will show how a BIT with the United States will help increase
this amount and place Cuba among its neighbors in terms of FDI
inflows.

111. Katz, supra note 88, at 129.
112. Id. at 130; see also Law No. 77, Foreign Investment Act of 1995 (Cuban
legislation).
113. Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 888–89; see also Law No. 77.
114. See Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 916.
115. See Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 522.
116. Ley Número 118 Foreign Investment Act (Mar. 29, 2014),
http://www.cubadiplomatica.cu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=IsdGCVp5To%3D&tabid=21894. Law 118 also repealed Law 77. Id.
117. Raul J. Valdes-Fauli, What Does the New Cuban Foreign Investment Act
Mean?, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Jul. 2014), http://www.foxrothschild.com
/publications/what-does-the-new-cuban-foreign-investment-act-mean/.
118. Law number 118.
119. Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 891.
120. See id.
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II. ANALYSIS

Research shows that BITs help increase FDI in developing
nations.121 Cuba is in desperate need of foreign capital and is
slowly opening itself up to foreign investment.122 A BIT with the
United States will help Cuba attract the foreign capital it needs
by subduing the fears of American firms as they look to Cuba as
an investment option.
A. CUBA’S INVESTMENT CLIMATE IS READY FOR HIGHER FDI
FLOWS
Cuba has shown steady improvement in attempting to
attract foreign investors and its regulatory framework has
slowly opened to allow foreign investment.
1. Current Economic Conditions in Cuba
Cuban law is a mixture of European civil law and socialism,
but as a transitional country it needs to liberalize its market to
meet capitalist needs.123 Cuba must include international
business norms and provide stability and predictability in any
new law intended to promote foreign investment.124 The impetus
behind this change comes from the nation’s desperate need of
FDI because it has no other significant source of foreign
capital.125 Cuba needs foreign investment as a source of hard
currency in order to reverse the contraction of its economy.126
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba began making
changes in foreign investment and trade regulations to attract
foreign capital.127 Law 77 account for much of the progress
121. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 105–07.
122. See generally Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 891 (stating that
since 2001, new ventures and total amount of new foreign investment in Cuba
have declined immensely).
123. See Katz, supra note 88, at 109–10, 126. Cuba is a transitional economy
because it attempts to keep socialism and large parts of its domestic economy
under the control of the state. Id. at 111.
124. Id. at 129.
125. See Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 904. Cuba receives
virtually no aid from foreign governments or international organizations, and
it is unable to receive loans from multinational institutions due to its history of
defaults. Id.
126. Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 513.
127. See Katz, supra note 88, at 125.

2017]

INCREASING FDI IN CUBA

265

during this time period. While Cuba has made progress since it
cut ties with the Soviet Union, restraints on foreign investment
remain. “The main reason for this failure [of attracting foreign
investment] is the contradictory attitude of the Cuban
government towards investment, the obstacles and restrictions
that are placed before a prospective investor, and the ominous
shadow of U.S. sanctions and other external factors.”128 The
largest barrier is internal, caused by bureaucratic management
systems.129 Law 77 changed the process for investment approval,
but it is cumbersome and unpredictable.130 For Cuba to attract
more foreign investment, the country must loosen its control
over the process, making it easier for investors to enter.
However, attracting foreign investment contradicts Cuba’s
desire to maintain its socialist structure.
In addition to bureaucracy, other restraints on progress
exist. One restraint on foreign investment is the fear that
investors under the Castro regime could be in legal trouble if a
new government takes over. This theory comes from the idea
that foreign investors may be considered accomplices to human
rights violations if they hire foreign workers.131 Another
restraint is the requirement to protect Cuba’s current exports,
its government imposed more barriers to foreign investment by
prohibiting investments directed at developing the Cuban
internal market.132 Finally, the government can terminate joint
ventures at will.133 While most of these barriers do not pose
significant risks to a foreign investment after it has commenced
in the country, it does affect the investor’s perceptions and
willingness to even begin the endeavor.
2. Investors’ Perceptions and Experience in Cuba
The United States has minimal numbers of investors in
Cuba. By analyzing other countries’ experiences in Cuba, we can
see how foreign investors perceive Cuba and are treated in the
country after establishing different investments. Between 1990
and 1999, foreign investment in Cuba reached between 1.3

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 944.
See id. at 939.
Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 521–22.
See Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 885, n.3.
Travieso-Diaz & Ferrate, supra note 95, at 527.
Id. at 528.
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billion and 1.7 billion dollars.134 This coincides with the time of
rapid BIT expansion across the globe. In 2002, Spain was the
leading investor in Cuba, followed by Canada, Italy, and finally
France.135 In terms of overall investment money flowing into
Cuba, the largest sources are Canada, Italy, Mexico, and
Australia.136 Cuba has an effective BIT with Mexico, Italy,
Spain, and France, but not with Canada or Australia.137 Eight of
Cuba’s top ten investing countries signed BITs with Cuba,
demonstrating that most of the top sources of FDI have signed
BITs with Cuba.138
A total of 540 enterprises with foreign investors have been
established in Cuba.139 These statistics show a significant
number of countries and companies believe that the investment
opportunity outweighs the inherent risk of investing in Cuba.
Foreign ownership is allowed in the nation for all sectors of the
economy except for education, armed forces, and private
residential dwellings.140 In fact, by the time United States trade
amounted to $38.155 billion, United States companies had
already entered markets for healthcare, food, and agriculture
products.141 For other foreign investors, the largest sector areas
are tourism, telecommunications, and mining; with tourism the
most dominant sector.142 The country could be a prime market
for investment, especially in the areas of public utilities and
infrastructure.
BITs signed with Cuba follow the generally accepted norms
of most BITs. By 2002, the nation had signed over 60 BITs with
other countries. 143 “[C]uba has negotiated a series of bilateral
134. Jorge F. Pérez-López & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Contribution of
BITs to Cuba’s Foreign Investment Program, 32 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 529, 558–
59 (2001).
135. See Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 891.
136. See Katz, supra note 88, at 131.
137. See International Investment Agreements Navigator: Cuba, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, http://investment
policyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/52 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016); see also
Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 560 tbl.2 (depicting an individual country’s
amount of investment in Cuba and whether they signed a BIT).
138. See Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 560.
139. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 917.
140. See Katz, supra note 88, at 130.
141. Id. at 112. Investing in these markets aligns with the policies and
restrictions put forth in the embargo. Note, these numbers represent trade
amounts and not FDI or ownership values.
142. See id. at 131; see also Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 892.
143. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 916.
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investment treaties, or BITS. Such agreements have become a
common way to reduce political risk in international
investment.”144 The scope of Cuban BITs, set by the definition of
“investments,” is very similar to the general model for defining
investments in BITs.145 Cuba’s BITs also recognize the mostfavored-nation treatment and expropriation clauses calling for
compensation that is immediate, adequate, and effective.146
Finally, they have non-discrimination clauses, which provide
more protection than is given under Cuban legislation.147 Not
only do these existing BITs show that the treaties provide
internationally accepted protections, they also show Cuba’s
commitment to expanding and honoring its BITs.
Along with international investment agreements, Cuba has
experience with foreign investment disputes and arbitration.
Cuba has already been using a dispute resolution system with a
neutral international forum and choice of law clauses, showing
the nation’s respect for the process; thereby reducing investment
risk.148 Its foreign trade arbitration court is quite developed as
arbitrators are trained in international commercial law and
participate
extensively
in
international
arbitration
organizations.149 These measures for increasing the
independence of arbitration mechanisms place emphasis on how
a BIT would be effective, because BITs are most effective when
a country already has an existing favorable climate for
investments.
Arbitration under current Cuban BITs differs slightly from
Cuba’s own arbitration systems. Disputes regarding the
interpretation and implementation of the treaty are encouraged
to be resolved through diplomatic measures and then by an ad
hoc arbitral panel, if necessary.150 Each country chooses one of
144. Katz, supra note 88, at 132,
145. See Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 543 (“Cuban BITs define
‘investments’ as every kind of asset or right accrued in accord with domestic
legislation of the country where the investment took place.”).
146. See id. at 547–48, 551. Under the most-favored-nation treatment, “each
party commits to grant to investors of the other party the same treatment (i.e.,
no less favorable treatment) as that accorded to domestic investors, under
national treatment, or to investors of a third country, under most-favorednation treatment, engaged in similar activities.” Id. at 547–48.
147. Id. at 557.
148. See generally Katz, supra note 88, at 132 (describing Cuba’s close
connections with the International Chamber of Commerce International Court
of Arbitration (ICA)).
149. See id. at 134.
150. See Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 552.
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the three panel members, then together the two selected
members choose the third neutral member.151 This process
generates equal participation in the selection of a neutral panel.
For investor-state issues, they also have a six-month period for
settlement negotiations before a dispute can move to binding
arbitration using international dispute settlement mechanisms
(e.g. International Chamber of Commerce or the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law).152 The framework
exists in Cuba for investors to begin to fully participate in the
country. A BIT coupled with the slowly liberalizing economy
could exponentially increase FDI in Cuba.
B. A BIT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA WOULD
REDUCE THE REMAINING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
INVESTING IN CUBA AND WOULD INCREASE FDI
While Cuba is slowly liberalizing its economy, some risks
remain that would affect investors’ decision to invest money in a
foreign country. Investors may be weary of investment
opportunities because the embargo created such a unique
relationship between the United States and Cuba. A BIT will
provide further protection for foreign investors from the Cuban
government and it will increase the amount of FDI inflow to
Cuba.
1. Protection from the Cuban Government
Trumbull argues that Cuba needs reform in order to
increase investment and that new laws “[s]hould have three
main characteristics: 1) it should afford equitable, nondiscriminatory treatment to foreign investors; 2) it should
provide adequate protection to the investors’ property; and 3) it
should establish a simple and effective regulatory
framework.”153 A BIT accomplishes all of these measures
without having to change the host state’s laws or go through the
lengthy legislative process, except for BIT ratification.
Furthermore, arbitration is a key factor in a transitional
country for liberalizing its economy and “[o]ne of the more acute
151. Id. at 552.
152. See id. at 553. Cuba’s BITs vary in regard to the dispute settlement
body. Id. at 554–55.
153. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 939.
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needs of a transitional economy seeking to increase foreign trade
is a system for resolving disputes among private economic
entities, as well as disputes between private entities and the
host state or state-run enterprises.”154 BITs provide a separate
arbitration and dispute resolution mechanism that would help a
transitional economy bring its practices in line with
international norms. As shown earlier, BITs increase the
amount of protection provided for foreign investors. This would
reduce the risk of investing in Cuba because United States
investors would know they could turn to international,
independent fora for a fair result.
In addition to arbitration provisions, BITs provide
protection through consequences associated with failing to abide
by the treaty. Even if there were no enforcement measures
available, a country that fails to follow a BIT would suffer
immensely from the withdrawal of FDI and investor
prospects.155 Breach of a BIT would be considered a breach of
international treaty law further disrupting the relationship
between a host nation and the investing nation. The treaties
have “[a] signaling or reputation-building effect for governments
that enact the treaties.”156 Cuba signing a BIT demonstrates its
commitment to protecting foreign investors. Cuba will be
strongly dissuaded from violating the treaty with the United
States because doing so would result in a decrease in foreign
investments from the United States and many other countries.
Both these heightened consequences for violation and
procedural rights granted to investors lower the risk for
companies as they plan expansion in Cuba.
2. The BIT Will Increase FDI from the United States and
Other Countries in General
The existence of previous foreign investments in Cuba from
the United States is evidence that the nation has a high capacity
for foreign investment when the proper investment climate is
established.157 BITs strengthen relations between nations,
resulting in increased trade, foreign aid, security assistance, and
154. See Katz, supra note 88, at 110.
155. Pérez-López noted that there is a consensus among developed and
developing countries that protection of investments is in the country’s national
interest. Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 532.
156. Franck, supra note 6, at 347.
157. See Travieso-Diaz & Musa, supra note 94, at 886.
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technological transfers for developing countries.158 BIT growth
in the 1990s resulted from a decrease in foreign aid for
developing countries and their difficulty in obtaining foreign
financing via debt.159 Cuba suffers from an inability to obtain
foreign aid or multinational bank loans. A BIT with the United
States would provide a source of foreign capital, thereby
stabilizing the Cuban economy.
BITs increase FDI generally, and signing a treaty with the
United States increases flows from United States and other
countries’ investors. “[T]he less developed the country (thus with
fewer overall BITs), the more apparent effect any one BIT will
have.”160 Cuba must promote foreign investment to aid economic
development and BITs are one way to pursue investment
promotion.161 Other transitioning states that have signed BITs
have seen large increases in FDI. Also, most of Cuba’s top foreign
investors come from countries that have investment treaty
agreements with Cuba. This shows how the United States could
be included among these investors as long as the two countries
can form an agreement on investments.
Finally, Cuba stands ready to become a future trading
partner of the United States. 162 United States companies are
incentivized to invest in Cuba due to the nation’s geographic
location and economic needs. The embargo shows significant
signs of wear,163 and companies are interested in expanding into
Cuba. The softening of the United States’ approach to Cuba is
caused by multiple factors: the frustration with an ineffective
unilateral economic sanction; national openness to having
normal trading relations with China and Vietnam, but not Cuba;
and perhaps most importantly, lobbying efforts by United States

158. See Ma, supra note 4, at 583.
159. See Pérez-López, supra note 134, at 532.
160. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 106.
161. See id. at 77; see also Shenkin, supra note 10, at 578 (“[F]oreign
investment is one of the best ways for developing nations to attract badly needed
development capital.”).
162. See Antonio R. Zamora, Foreign Investment in Cuba: A U.S. Perspective,
14 PROB. & PROP. 57, 57 (2000).
163. Id.; see also Karen DeYoung et al., Obama Begins Historic Visit to Cuba,
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/as-cubans-wait-for-obama-tension-and-excitement-on-havanasstreets/2016/03/20/78726756-eed1-11e5-89c3-a647fcce95e0_story.html; Obama
to Congress: “Lift the Cuba Embargo,” HAVANA TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=116059 (detailing President Obama’s remarks,
given after the United States re-opened diplomatic relations with Cuba).
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businesses that want to expand to new markets.164 Additionally,
making investments in Cuba creates a natural gateway for trade
between North America and Latin America.165 Most countries
investing in Cuba have a BIT for added protection, and the
United States should follow suit. Thus, entering a BIT would
benefit both parties: Cuba would see FDI increases; and
American businesses would expand their footprint.
III.

CONCLUSION

BITs help investors feel more secure in investing in
developing countries, leading to more investments. Such an
increase helps developing countries generate more capital for
further growth. A BIT between the United States and Cuba
would serve to increase foreign investors’ confidence in Cuba’s
treatment of foreign investments. It will also provide
desperately needed capital to a country in economic transition.
Investors would feel more comfortable as the BIT provides
procedural rights of enforcement and Cuba’s position is such
that trade between the two countries would be highly, and
mutually, beneficial. The only remaining question is whether
they can reach an agreement after years of distaste and broken
relationships.

164. See Zamora, supra note 162, at 57.
165. Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 96, at 919.

